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INTRODUCTION 
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals ("The Commission") submitted its report and suggestions to the 
United States Congress and the President in December 1998.1 The 
Commission, which Congress authorized during November 1997, spent 
ten months studying the "structure and alignment of the Federal Court of 
Appeals system, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit," and two 
months developing "recommendations for such changes in circuit 
boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious and 
effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due process."2 The 
centerpiece of the Commission's proposal is the suggestion that Congress 
require the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to 
implement three regionally-based adjudicatory divisions and authorize 
the remaining appellate courts to institute divisional arrangements as 
they increase in size. Lawmakers intended that the Commission craft 
recommendations which would help Congress resolve the controversial, 
ongoing debate over the Ninth Circuit and to address the dramatic 
caseload expansion that has transformed the appeals courts from the 
institutions which they were a generation ago. Indeed, the 
Commission's report and proposals could well chart the destiny of the 
appellate courts for the twenty-first century. 
It should not be surprising, therefore, that the suggestions proffered by 
the Commission have received great attention. Many federal court 
observers, including members of the judicial and legislative branches, 
have expended much energy analyzing and responding to the 
recommendations. For example, Procter Hug, Jr., the Chief Judge of the 
United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, which figured prominently in 
the Commission's study and proposals, authored a cogent critique of the 
suggestions.3 Numerous legal scholars have evaluated the 
recommendations and reached positive and negative condusions.4 
' See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Final 
Report 29 [hereinafter Final Report]. Citations to Final Report can be found at 
http:/ /app.comm.uscourts.gov (last visited Oct. 25, 2000). Hard copies of all cited Final 
Report Documents are on file with the UC Davis Law Review. 
' Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 
2491 (1997). 
3 See Procter Hug, Jr., The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals' Final Report: An Analysis of the Commission's Recommendations for the Ninth Circuit, 32 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 887 (1999). 
• See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, The Unkindest Cut: The White Commission's Proposal to 
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Several senators, who represent Pacific Northwest states and who have 
been ardent proponents of splitting the Ninth Circuit into two appeals 
courts, introduced proposed legislation that adopted almost verbatim 
the statutory reforms suggested by the Commission a month after their 
issuance.5 
Virtually all of the examination which evaluators have devoted to the 
Commission's work shares one salient characteristic, however. In the 
commentators' apparent haste to praise or criticize the Commission's 
recommendations, they have essentially ignored the elaborate 
descriptive account of the appellate courts that the commissioners 
compiled. For instance, observers have neglected the Working Papers of 
the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals.6 This 348-page volume includes a number of studies which the 
Commission authorized and much information which it collected. The 
commissioners seemed to consult these materials closely in fashioning 
the report and proposals. 
The dearth of attention that commentators have accorded the 
Commission's description is remarkable. The Commission appeared to 
depend heavily on the descriptive account when drafting its report and 
suggestions. Change which is as drastic as the commissioners 
recommended in institutions that are as critical as the appeals courts 
should correspondingly have clear, substantial empirical support. The 
Commission also painted a rather detailed portrait of the appellate 
system or at least took numerous snapshots of the appeals courts, which 
yield instructive insights on them at the tum of the century and could 
inform their future reform and investigation. Indeed, the commissioners 
may well have constructed one of the richest modem accounts of those 
courts, thereby making the absence of scrutiny afforded the description 
even more striking. 
The above propositions mean that the descriptive account which the 
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals 
compiled warrants analysis. This article undertakes that effort. The first 
section evaluates the origins and development of the Commission and 
briefly describes its work. The second section selectively assesses the 
Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 377 (2000); Jennifer E. Spreng, Three Divisions 
In One Circuit?, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 551 (1999); Carl Tobias, A Federal Appellate System for the 
Twenty-First Century, 74 WASH. L. REv. 275 (1999). 
5 Compare S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999) with Final Report, supra note l, at 93. In March 
2000, senators introduced a circuit-splitting bill. See S. 2184, 106th Cong. (2000). 
' See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
Working Papers i-ii (1998) [hereinafter Working Papers]. 
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Commission's description and attempts to derive from the account 
useful perspectives on the twelve, specific regional circuits and the 
appellate system as well as additional, helpful lessons respecting the 
Commission's endeavors. Most significant, particular appeals courts 
appear to operate less efficaciously than they might. However, the 
empirical evidence which the Commission adduced appears insufficient 
to support definitive conclusions regarding the circuits' present 
condition, much less modifications that seem as dramatic as those which 
the commissioners proposed. The final section, therefore, suggests that 
Congress reject the Commission's recommendations and authorize 
further study, which should permit more conclusive determinations 
about the courts, or experimentation with promising measures. 
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF 1HE COMMISSION AND 1HE 
COMMISSION'S WORK 
The historical events which led senators and representatives to 
authorize the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal 
Courts of Appeals, as well as the commissioners' efforts, deserve 
comparatively limited consideration in this paper because they have 
received relatively thorough analysis elsewhere.7 Nonetheless, some 
treatment of the Commission's origins, development and work is 
justified. This type of examination can enhance appreciation of the 
Commission's descriptive account. For instance, it is important to 
understand that the commissioners completed the fourth significant 
evaluation of the federal courts in the last decade and that they built 
upon the three prior assessments.8 
A. Authorization of the Commission 
The immediate impetus for Congress to create the Commission was 
the continuing controversy which has involved the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The great size of the court has 
' See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 4; Hug, supra note 3; Spreng, supra note 4; Carl Tobias, 
Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49 FLA. L. REv. 189 (1997). 
8 See JUDITH MCKENNA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER 
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (1993); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
COMMfITEE, REPoRT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMfITEE (1990) (hereinafter 
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY REPORT]; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LoNG 
RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (December 1995) (hereinafter LoNG RANGE PLAN]; 
see also COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, H.R. REP. 
No. 105-26, at 2 (1997) (suggesting that Commission would build on Federal Courts Study 
Committee's work) [hereinafter HOUSE REPoRT]. 
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prompted efforts to restructure the Ninth Circuit virtually since 
lawmakers established the federal appellate system during 1891.9 The 
notion of magnitude encompasses the large complement of twenty-eight 
active appellate judges that Congress has authorized for the court, the 
circuit's substantial docket of nearly 9000 annual cases and the court's 
enormous geographic expanse of almost 1,350,000 square miles, which 
have allegedly promoted inconsistent, inefficient and incorrect decision 
making.10 Recent, serious efforts to bifurcate the Ninth Circuit began a 
decade and a half ago, while members of Congress who favor division 
have attempted to split the court on numerous occasions.11 
Republican Senators, who primarily represent states which are located 
in the Pacific Northwest, commenced the latest campaign to realign the 
Ninth Circuit during May 1995 by introducing a proposal that would 
have modified the appellate court.12 In the first session of the 104th 
Congress, the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary adopted 
a bill which would have restructured the Ninth Circuit.13 The measure's 
advocates lacked sufficient support to secure full Senate approval and, 
therefore, developed a compromise that would have authorized a 
national commission to analyze all of the appeals courts.14 The United 
States House of Representatives did not enact substantive legislation 
which would have created a commission; however, the House 
appropriated $500,000 for an evaluation.15 
During the initial session of the 105th Congress, senators and 
representatives introduced bills that would have split the Ninth Circuit 
or which would have instituted a study of the federal appellate system.16 
' See Final Report, supra note 1, at 33; see generally NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 
REORGANIZATION ACTOF1995, s. REP. No. 104-197 (1995) [hereinafterSENATEREPoRT]. 
10 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 34-36. 
11 See id. at 33-34. See generally Tobias, supra note 7, at 196-214. 
12 See S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995). See generally Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit 
Split Study Commission: Naw What?, 57 MONT. L. REv. 313, 313-15 (1996); Carl Tobias, The 
Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L. J. 1357 (1995). 
13 See s. 956; SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, Markup of s. 956 (Dec. 7, 1995). See 
generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 9; Jennifer E. Spreng, The Icebox Cometh: A Former 
Clerk's View of the Proposed Ninth Circuit Split, 73 WASH. L. REV. 875, 887 (1998). 
" See 142 CONG. REC. S254 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murkowski). 
See generally Carl Tobias, A Proposal to Study the Federal Appellate System, 167 F.R.D. 275, 279 
(1996). 
15 See 142 CONG. REC. Hll,848, Hll,859 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996). See generally 
Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the 
Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 409 (1998). 
1
' See, e.g., S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997); S .248, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 908, 105th Cong. 
(1997); see also Tobias, supra note 7, at 205-14 (analyzing developments in 105th Congress). 
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In June 1997, the House of Representatives unanimously approved a 
measure that would have implemented an assessment of the appeals 
courts.17 The next month, senators who championed Ninth Circuit 
division persuaded the upper chamber to adopt an appropriations rider 
which would have reconfigured the appellate court.18 However, 
members of the House - including the entire delegation from the state of 
California and Representative Henry Hyde (R-lli.), Chair of the House 
Judiciary Committee - opposed bifurcation. Congress eventually agreed 
to a compromise that authorized a national evaluation.19 The legislation 
empowered the Chief Justice of the United States to name the 
Commission's five members no later than thirty days from the date of 
statutory passage.20 The measure accorded the commissioners ten 
months to "study the structure and alignment of the Federal Court of 
Appeals system, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit," and two 
months to draft a report with recommendations for such "changes in 
circuit boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious 
and effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due 
process. "21 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist selected as Commission members 
retired United States Supreme Court Associate Justice Byron R. White, 
Sixth Circuit Judge Gilbert S. Merritt, Ninth Circuit Judge Pamela Ann 
Rymer, District Judge William D. Browning of Arizona and immediate 
past American Bar Association President N. Lee Cooper.22 Lawmakers 
wisely appropriated generous resources of $900,000 that ostensibly could 
have permitted the Commission to perform a thoroughgoing analysis.23 
However, Congress assigned the relatively small number of 
commissioners a potentially gigantic task and accorded the five 
individuals a truncated period for completing all of the work entailed.24 
For instance, the Commission had less time to evaluate the appellate 
" See H.R. 908, 105th Cong. (1997); 143 CONG. REC. H3223 (daily ed. June 3, 1997) 
(statement of Rep. Coble). 
" See S. 1022, 105th Cong.,§ 305 (1997); 143 CONG. REC. 58041 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) 
(statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
" See Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 
Stat. 2491 (1997). 
"' See Department of Justice Appropriation Act§§ 305(a)(2)(A)-(B). 
21 Department of Justice Appropriation Act § 305(a)(l)(B); see also Tobias, supra note 7, 
at 206-11 (analyzing measure). 
22 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 1, 92. 
23 See Department ofJustice Appropriation Act§ 305(b). 
" See Department of Justice Appropriation Act§ 305(a)(6). 
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courts than most of the circuits need for deciding appeals25 and a shorter 
period and fewer members1Jthan similar, earlier entities, including the 
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System 
("Hruska Commission"), the Federal Courts Study Committee and the 
Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States.26 This situation may have seriously compromised what 
the Commission could achieve. 
B. The Commission's Efforts 
The commissioners seemed to discharge faithfully the substantial 
statutory responsibilities that Congress assigned the Commission.27 
Throughout 1998, the Commission attempted to solicit considerable 
public input. During the spring, the entity conducted six public hearings 
at which eighty-nine witnesses testified in metropolitan areas across the 
country: Atlanta, Dallas, Chicago, New York, Seattle and San Francisco.28 
Five of these cities currently serve as the headquarters for regional 
circuits, while Seattle would apparently be the headquarters of any new 
Twelfth Circuit that Congress might create from the current Ninth 
Circuit. 
The Commission worked closely with the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) 
and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the primary 
research and administrative arms of the federal courts, which lawmakers 
astutely authorized the commissioners to consult.29 Some FJC staff, who 
served as expert advisors for the commissioners, had been actively 
involved in prior studies of the federal judicial system. Two experienced 
FJC employees assumed major responsibility for designing surveys that 
the Commission circulated to appeals and district court judges and 
appellate attorneys, which sought their perspectives on the regional 
circuits' operations. Moreover, one FJC employeee and several other FJC 
25 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 95 tbl.7; U.S. Courts of Appeals, Median Time 
Intervals in Cases Terminated After Hearing or Submission, By Circuit During the Twelve-
Month Period Ending Dec. 31, 1999. 
26 See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical 
Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973) 
[hereinafter Hruska Commission]; LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 8, FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
REPORT, supra note 8. 
77 See Final Report, supra note 1%t 1-6. 
" See id. at 2-3. 
29 See id. at 3-4; see also De~ent of Justice Appropriation Act § 305(a)(4)(D) 
(authorizing Commission to secure research services from FJC and administrative services 
from Administrative Office of U.S. iourts); 28 U.S.C. § 620 et seq. (1994) (authorizing FJC); 
28 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1994) (authorizing Administrative Office). 
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staff members undertook numerous analyses of the courts at the entity's 
behest.30 
The Commission also assembled statistical material related to the 
functioning of the regional circuits. For example, the entity collected 
information on the percentage of cases that the appellate courts accord 
oral arguments and written dispositions, on the time which the tribunals 
require to decide appeals, and on the measures that circuits have used to 
address the steadily rising dockets which have substantially altered the 
appellate courts since the 1970s.31 
The Commission members analyzed all of the input that they had 
gathered or had received. On October 7, 1998, the Commission 
published a tentative draft report and recommendations on which the 
Commission sought public comment during a thirty-day period.32 Some 
people and interests that the Commission draft determinations and 
recommendations would affect responded favorably. However, more 
observers submitted comments which criticized those findings and 
suggestions. Individuals and entities with quite diverse views evinced 
considerable dissatisfaction.330nce the commissioners examined the 
public comments, they made minor changes in the tentative draft report 
and published a final report on December 18.34 
In short, the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal 
Courts of Appeals attempted to fulfill conscientiously the burdensome 
duties that Congress imposed in the limited time provided by senators 
and representatives. The Commission members assembled relevant 
material on the intermediate appeals courts, widely sought public input, 
pinpointed the most troubling problems which the circuits apparently 
encounter and fashioned remedies for these complications that the 
commissioners seemingly thought would be effective. Despite the 
Commission's efforts, the Commission failed to adduce persuasive 
30 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 4; Working Papers, supra note 6, at ii. 
31 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 21-25, 39; see also FEDERAL COURTS STUDY REPORT, 
supra note 8, at 109 (stating that caseload increases have transformed Circuits). 
32 See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Tentative 
Draft Report (Oct. 7, 1998) [hereinafter Draft Report]; see also Hug, supra note 3, at 894-95 
(comparing tentative draft report and final report). 
33 See, e.g., American Bar Association, Comments to the Commission on Structural 
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 6, 1998); U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
Comments to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals 
(Nov. 6, 1998); Todd D. True, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund, Comments to the 
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 6, 1998); 
Harry Edwards et al., Comments to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the 
Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 10, 1998). 
" See Final Report, supra note 1. 
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empirical evidence that clearly demonstrates that the courts now 
experience complications which are problematic enough to deserve 
treatment. This is particularly true with measures that appear as 
potentially inefficacious as the divisional arrangement proposed. 
Nevertheless, the commissioners did compile a helpful description of the 
regional circuits at the close of the twentieth century. 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT 
This section selectively evaluates the Commission's descriptive 
account and attempts to extract from this description informative 
insights on individual appeals courts and the whole appellate system as 
well as additional instructive ideas. The section also discusses how 
particular circuits may be functioning less effectively than they could. 
Finally, this section argues that the empirical data and remaining 
material, which the Commission collected and assessed, cannot support 
definitive conclusions respecting the current circumstances of the courts 
or major reform. 
A. Specific Appeals Courts 
1. An Introductory Word 
The Commission accumulated, analyzed and synthesized considerable 
empirical evidence and other applicable information on the twelve, 
specific circuits, much pertaining to the 1997 fiscal year, the most recent 
period for which the material was available.35 The objective information 
implicates numerous parameters, including the time from case filing to 
disposition, that are "routinely used in court administration to measure 
the performance and efficiency of the federal appellate courts."36 The 
commissioners correspondingly consulted "subjective criteria, such as 
consistency and predictability of [circuit law, which] are obviously more 
difficult to evaluate but are widely regarded as a high priority" for these 
35 The Commission did compile some historical data. References to annual data in this 
article are for the 1997 fiscal year, unless otherwise indicated. See Working Papers, supra 
note6. 
36 Final Report, supra note 1, at 39. "These include the number of appeals a court 
disposes of ('dispositions') or ('terminations') relative to the number of cases filed, how 
many cases are orally argued and how many are decided on the briefs, how many 
dispositions result in published opinions and how many in unpublished memoranda or 
summary orders, the time from filing to disposition, and how often the court relies on 
visiting judges from outside the circuit." Id. 
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tribunals, primarily by conducting surveys of appeals and district court 
judges as well as appellate attomeys.37 
When this material is considered together for each circuit, the 
information forms a composite picture or profile. Indeed, the 
comparison of every court's performance with the national average and 
with the efforts compiled by the remaining eleven circuits suggests how 
well individual courts work, subject to appropriate caveats, regarding, 
for instance, relevance and reliability. As a general matter, objective 
numerical data will be highly relevant and dependable. Specific 
examples are the percentages of oral arguments and published opinions 
which circuits afford. That statistical material has considerable 
applicability, because it can reflect how substantially courts honor 
important process values involving access to justice, while the 
information is more reliable than survey responses, which are subjective 
and can be self-interested. 
Although objective numerical data are generally dependable, they 
often must be refined, contextualized or elaborated. One helpful 
illustration is the number of appeals that a circuit terminates compared 
to the quantity of filings that the court receives.38 This comparison and, 
indeed, both figures have little meaning, unless augmented by material 
on caseload composition, such as the appeals' complexity. The 
percentages of oral arguments and published opinions are equally 
unpersuasive without analogous supplementation. Similarly instructive 
is the commissioners' decision to exclude senior appellate judges of the 
particular circuit from "visiting judges" when counting how many three-
judge panels included at least one visitor.39 That determination should 
enhance accuracy because senior appellate judges of the specific court 
generally have greater familiarity with the circuit's law, traditions and 
members, and more closely resemble its active judges, than panel 
participants who have not served as active judges of the court. Another 
example is much objective information which the Commission gathered 
on the Ninth Circuit during the 1997 fiscal year.40 The actual importance 
of this material can be precisely calculated only by allowing for the fact 
that the court functioned throughout the relevant period absent nearly 
one-quarter of its active judges.41 
" Id.; see also Working Papers, supra note 6, at 3-91. 
38 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
39 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 108 tbl.6a. 
"' Seeid.at93-99, 100-13. 
" See Final Report, supra note 1, at 30. See generally Carl Tobias, Filling The Federal 
Appellate Openings on the Ninth Circuit, 19 REV. LmG. 233 (2000). 
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Were these problems amenable to remediation or amelioration, certain 
difficult, and perhaps intractable, complications would remain. 
illustrative are the complexities entailed in defining and measuring the 
related, rather esoteric ideas of appellate justice, effective appeals court 
operation and the appellate ideal. The exercise may therefore implicate 
normative value judgments. A useful definition of appellate justice, and 
possibly of efficacious performance, which derives from Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure l, is the prompt, inexpensive and equitable resolution of 
cases. 
42 
There is concomitantly some consensus that the appellate ideal means 
merits-based disposition of each appeal after thorough briefing and oral 
argument, close consultation among a panel comprising three active 
appellate judges of the circuit, and the issuance of a published opinion 
which comprehensively explains the conclusion reached.43 This article 
emphasizes appellate justice and effective operation because all three 
concepts are inextricably intertwined. The first two concepts can 
felicitously and fairly serve as surrogates for the appellate ideal, which is 
more difficult to define and calculate. Federal Rule 1 specifically helps 
give meaning to appellate justice, and a few of that construct's 
constituents should accommodate objective measurement. The 
commissioners correspondingly appeared to employ as a standard 
efficacious functioning, a notion which they seemed to consider 
comparatively lenient and which is rather easily defined.44 
Even if the three concepts could be assigned clearer meaning, they are 
relative terms whose application may depend on context and exacting 
calibration, partly because burgeoning caseloads and finite resources 
have transformed the courts and frustrated their efforts to deliver 
appellate justice, to operate effectively and to realize the appellate ideal.45 
In comparing the circuits, therefore, evaluators must remember that 
courts can deploy their limited funding differently to treat escalating 
appeals and that these diverse ways of proceeding could be equally 
" See FED. R. Crv. P. l; see also Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of 
Rule: The Example of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B.U.L. REv. 1325 (1995); Carl Tobias, 
The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 1264, 1286 
n.90 (1996). 
43 See, THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL - THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. 
COURTS OF APPEALS 14-30 (1994); MCKENNA, supra note 8, at 9-11; FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
REPORT, supra note 8, at 109. 
" See, e.g., Final Report, supra note 1, at ix-xi, 29-30; see also infra. note 146. 
" See BAKER, supra note 43, at 14-30, 287-302; Martha Dragich, Once a Century: Time for 
a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1; Carl Tobias, Dear 
Justice White, 30 ARiz. ST. L. J. 1127 (1998). 
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acceptable. For instance, one circuit's judges may believe that they 
perform best by affording some written explanation, however brief, 
although the court publishes a relatively small percentage of opinions or 
rather infrequently grants oral arguments.46 The members of another 
circuit might concomitantly think that they can work most efficaciously 
by issuing comparatively few published opinions but hearing oral 
arguments in a substantial percentage of cases.47 Thus, these, and 
numerous additional, approaches to the resolution of increasing dockets 
with relatively restricted resources may be satisfactory. 
The Commission apparently recognized certain problems with the 
objective and subjective criteria. For example, the commissioners were 
not able to say that the objective "statistical criteria tip decisively in one 
direction or the other. While there are differences among the courts of 
appeals, differences in judicial vacancy rates, caseload mix, and 
operating procedures make it impossible to attribute them to any single 
factor such as size."48 The Commission members also candidly admitted: 
"In the time allotted, we could not possibly have undertaken a 
statistically meaningful analysis of opinions as well as unpublished 
dispositions, dissents, and petitions for rehearing en bane to make our 
own objective determination of how the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
measures up to others."49 The commissioners ultimately concluded that 
"neither we nor, we believe, anyone else, can reduce consistency and 
predictability to statistical analysis. These concepts are too subtle, the 
decline in quality too incremental, and the effects of size too difficult to 
isolate, to allow evaluation in a freeze-framed moment."50 The 
Commission did assert that "consistency and predictability have to do 
with the coherence of the law declared over time" and that the appellate 
process places a "premium on collegial deliberation," even as the entity 
conceded that the idea of collegiality cannot be quantified or measured.51 
However, the commissioners offered their essentially unsupported 
46 This apparently is the tradition in the Ninth Circuit. See Interview with Judge 
Procter Hug, Jr., Chief Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Las Vegas, Nev. (May 7, 
1999) [hereinafter Hug Interview]; Interview with Judge Pamela Ann Rymer, Judge, Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in D.C. (Mar. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Rymer Interview]; see also 
Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.3. 
" This apparently is the tradition in the Second Circuit. See Interview with Judge Jose 
Cabranes, Judge, Second Circuit of Appeals, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Jan. 21, 1999); see also 
Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.2. 
48 Final Report, supra note 1, at 39. 
" Id. 
so Id at 40. 
s1 Id. 
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"judgment that the consistent, predictable, coherent development of the 
law over time is best fostered in a decisional unit that is small enough for 
the kind of close, continual, collaborative decision making that 'seeks the 
objective of as much excellence in a group's decision as its combined 
talents, experience and energy permit. "'52 
Despite the complications delineated above, it is possible to compare 
specific courts' operation in terms of the indicia on which the 
Commission collected material and by providing for the difficulties 
identified. The next subsection assesses how the First Circuit functioned 
vis-a-vis the parameters for which the commissioners assembled 
applicable, objective information by contrasting the court's efforts with 
the national average and with the performance of other circuits. This 
exercise is a useful illustration, although relatively little additional 
benefit would be derived from reproducing similar raw data for all 
twelve courts.53 The analysis then affords a comparative snapshot of 
those circuits, emphasizing the courts that appear to operate most and 
least efficaciously, and offers additional insights on the individual 
circuits. 
2. The First Circuit as an illustration of Specific Courts 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is the smallest 
appellate court, apart from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, in terms of many applicable considerations. 
Except for the D.C. Circuit, the First Circuit serves the smallest 
population base (13.3 million individuals), exercises jurisdiction over the 
tiniest land base (52,000 square miles), includes the fewest federal 
districts (five), has the smallest number of active appellate (six) and 
district (twenty-nine) judges, each year receives the least cases (1450) and 
annually resolves the fewest appeals (1370).54 In the 1997 fiscal year, 
52 Id. (quoting FRANK COFFIN, ON APPEAL 215 (1994)); see also infra notes 148-49 and 
accompanying text. 
53 These data are rather readily accessible in the Final Report and Working Papers. See, 
e.g., Final Report, supra note 1, at 14, 22, 24, 27; Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93-99. I 
tersely treat the subjective material. See infra note 69. Much of it comprises personal 
opinions and even that related to the Ninth Circuit is not very instructive. See infra note 
120 and accompanying text. 
54 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 27 tbl.2-9; see also id. (affording data for D.C. 
Circuit). The D.C. Circuit is peculiar in several respects, especially the many appeals from 
agency decisions that it hears. See CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. 
CIRCUIT COURT (1999); Colloquy, The Contributions of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 
40 ADMIN. L. REV. 507 (1988); Spottswood W. Robinson, ill, The D.C. Circuit: An Era of 
Change, 55 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 715 (1987). 
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members of the First Circuit decided 696 cases on the merits, which was 
the lowest figure nationwide.55 The court concomitantly terminated 116 
appeals per authorized active judgeship on the merits as compared to the 
national average of 155.56 Only the Tenth Circuit with 115 and the D.C. 
Circuit with sixty-one resolved fewer cases per authorized judgeship.57 
During the 1997 fiscal year, judges of the First Circuit conducted oral 
arguments in 61 percent of the appeals that the court decided on the 
merits.58 This statistic was substantially higher than the nationwide 
average of 40 percent. It was eclipsed only in the Second Circuit and was 
more than twice the percentage compiled by the Third, Fourth, Tenth 
and Eleventh Circuits, which granted oral arguments in only 30 percent 
of those courts' cases.59 
For the 1997 fiscal year, members of the First Circuit issued published 
opinions in 51 percent of the appeals that the court resolved on the 
merits.6() This figure was more than two times the national average of 23 
percent and was greater than thrice the percentages which the Third, 
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits compiled.61 In the 1997 fiscal year, 
members of the First Circuit correspondingly terminated 32 percent of 
the cases on the merits after oral argument.62 This number was ten 
percent larger than the system-wide average and double that of the 
Third Circuit.6.3 
During the 1997 fiscal year, 25 percent .0£ three-judge panels which 
resolved cases after oral argument in the First Circuit included at least 
one visiting appellate or district court judge.64 This record was eight 
percentage points below the national averag~, while 64 percent of panels 
constituted by the Eleventh Circuit had a 'participant who was not an 
active judge of the court.65 0 
Between the 1995 and 1997 fiscal years in the First Circuit, the median 
time interval in counseled civil, non-prisoner cases that the court 
terminated after hearing or submission was 8.9 months from the notice 
55 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.l. 
56 See id. 
57 See id.; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text (suggesting that D.C. Circuit's 
docket may partially explain small number of cases that it terminated). 
58 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.2. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. at 93 tbl.3. 
•
1 See id. 
62 See id. at 94 tbl.5. 
63 Seeid. 
64 See id. at 108 tbl.6a. 
65 See id. 
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of appeal to final disposition.66 The system-wide average during this 
period was 12.4 months, and the Ninth Circuit required 18.2 months, 
although the First Circuit was slower than the national average in three 
of the five parameters, which the Commission employed in evaluating 
time to disposition.67 
Examination of all the material above suggests that the First Circuit 
functions rather well. Illustrative is the large percentage of cases which 
the court accords oral arguments and published opinions. Those are 
important measures of appellate justice and effective operation. The 
First Circuit substantially surpassed the national average in each area 
and compiled percentages that were twice as high as some courts for oral 
arguments and three times greater than other tribunals for published 
opinions.68 These statistics, which seemingly reflect the considerable 
attention that the First Circuit devotes to most cases, may explain why 
the court resolved so few appeals on the merits and decided a 
comparatively small number of cases per authorized judgeship.69 The 
First Circuit also performed better than the national average for most of 
the remaining categories. In short, the First Circuit appears to be 
working relatively well. 
3. Conclusions Regarding Specific Appeals Courts 
a. A Comparison of How Specific Courts Perform 
The discussion at the outset of this subsection assessed several 
significant problems which complicate attempts to posit particularly 
definitive conclusions respecting the operation of specific appellate 
courts. 70 For example, the information that the Commission compiled 
seemingly lacks certain qualities, such as sufficient comprehensiveness, 
refinement, applicability and contextualization to support very certain 
determinations. Notwithstanding those difficulties, the circuits' 
functioning can be examined vis-a-vis the parameters for which the 
commissioners collected material and by allowing for the concerns 
06 See id. at 95 tbl.7. 
67 See id. Appeals and district court judges of the First Circuit as well as appellate 
attorneys who responded to the Commission survey seemed relatively satisfied with the 
consistency and predictability of circuit law as well as with the court's overall performance. 
See, e.g., id. at 19-21, 23-24, 47. 
68 See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. 
69 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
"' See supra notes 35-56 and accompanying text. 
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expressed earlier. 
This comparison indicates that the First and Seventh Circuits 
apparently performed best during the 1997 fiscal year. The First Circuit 
terminated the largest percentage of appeals on the merits in which oral 
argument was conducted and that resulted in published opinions,71 
while the Seventh Circuit compiled the third and second highest 
percentages respectively for these measures.72 Indeed, the two courts 
issued published opinions in more than twice the percentage of cases as 
the national average and exceeded virtually all of the remaining courts.73 
The First Circuit also decided cases most quickly from the notice of 
appeal to final disposition,74 and a minuscule 1 percent of the panels 
which the Seventh Circuit constituted included visiting participants.75 
Those are multiple, significant measures of whether courts dispense 
appellate justice, operate efficaciously and realize the appellate ideal. 
However, the two tribunals did not compile strong records in every 
area on which the Commission gathered information. For instance, only 
the D.C. and Tenth Circuits resolved fewer cases on the merits per 
authorized judgeship than the First Circuit,76 and the Seventh Circuit 
concluded appeals rather slowly in terms of several factors. 77 The figures 
may explain how the two courts were able to afford so many published 
opinions and why the First Circuit treated filings so expeditiously. 
The comparison suggests that the Third, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits 
seemingly performed least well during the 1997 fiscal year. The three 
tribunals were among the four circuits deciding the smallest percentages 
of cases on the merits in which there was oral argument78 and hearing the 
biggest percentages of appeals in which at least one visiting judge 
participated,79 while the three courts wrote the lowest percentages of 
published opinions.80 In fact, the Third and Eleventh Circuits issued 
fewer than one third the percentage of published opinions as the First 
71 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93-94 tbls.2 & 5; see also supra notes 58-63 and 
accompanying text. 
12 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93-94 tbls.2 & 5; see also Chicago Council of 
Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of Appeals Joi the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 673 (1994) (evaluating organization, principles, and judges of Seventh Circuit). 
73 See id. at 93 tbl.2. 
74 See id. at 95 tbl.7; see also supra text accompanying note 66. 
" See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 108 tbl.6a. 
1
• See id. at 93 tbl. 1; see also supra text accompanying note 56. 
77 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 95 tbl.7. 
" See id. at 93 tbl.2; see also id. (showing that Tenth Circuit was fourth court). 
79 See id. at 108 tbl. 6a; see also id. (showing that Ninth Circuit was fourth court). 
"' See id. at 93 tbl.3. 
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Circuit.81 The Fourth Circuit published less than one-quarter of that 
court's percentage, while the Eleventh Circuit employed visitors at a rate 
which was essentially double the nationwide average.82 The indicia are 
important yardsticks for ascertaining whether courts deliver appellate 
justice, function effectively and achieve the appellate ideal. 
The three tribunals did operate rather efficaciously vis-a-vis certain 
parameters. For example, the Third and Fourth Circuits were among the 
courts that most promptly resolved cases in terms of a few factors.83 The 
low percentages of oral arguments and published opinions as well as the 
large number of visiting participants reported above might explain how 
the tribunals were able to terminate appeals with relative expedition .. 
The Eleventh Circuit also concluded substantially more cases on the 
merits per authorized judgeship than all eleven of the courts: its figure 
was 275, the Fifth Circuit was second with 202 and the national average 
was 155.84 However, the Eleventh Circuit statistic could mean that these 
appeals received relatively little attention from appellate judges of the 
court. The Eleventh Circuit staffs panels with the highest percentage of 
visiting participants - 64, a figure which nearly doubles the system-wide 
average and which is 21 percentage points greater than the next closest 
court - and has the second biggest complement of staff attomeys.85 
It is ironic that a majority of the active members on the Third, Fourth 
and Eleventh Circuits have publicly urged Congress not to authorize 
additional judgeships for the courts.86 The jurists have so importuned 
lawmakers, even though the measures, involving conservative estimates 
of appellate caseloads and judicial resources, which the Judicial 
Conference employs to recommend judgeships for the circuits, may 
show that these courts need more judges.87 
'
1 See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 60. 
82 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 108 tbl.6a. 
83 See id. at 95 tbl.7. 
" See id. at 93 tbl.1; see also supra notes 58-59 (showing courts with fewest 
terminations). 
85 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 108 tbl.6a; Final Report, supra note 1, at 24 tbl.2-
8. A high percentage of pro se cases could also explain the statistic; however, a few other 
circuits receive larger percentages and absolute numbers of pro se appeals. See Working 
Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.1. 
86 See Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 23 
HAsTINGS CONST. L. Q. 741, 749 (1997); Tobias, supra note 12, at 1362. 
87 See Tobias, supra note 86, at 753. But see Charles E. Grassley, Chairman's Report on the 
Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the United States Courts of Appeals 2-7 (1999); J. Harvie 
Wilkinson, ill, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L. J. 1147, 1161-63 
(1994); but cf Appointment of Additional Federal Circuit and District Judges, S.1145, 106th 
Cong. (1999) (proposing no new positions for three courts). 
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The comparison indicates that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits 
apparently performed second worst. For instance, the Ninth Circuit 
issued the fourth smallest percentage of published opinions,88 decided 
cases most slowly from notice of appeal to final disposition89 and 
resolved the second highest percentage of cases with visiting judges.90 
The Tenth Circuit correspondingly tied the Third, Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits for the lowest percentage of appeals terminated on the merits 
after oral argument91 as well as the Fourth and Fifth Circuits for the 
second smallest percentage of cases concluded on the merits with oral 
argument,92 while the court was second only to the D.C. Circuit in least 
appeals decided on the merits per authorized judgeship.93 Nonetheless, 
each court worked rather well in other respects. The Ninth Circuit was 
one of the quicker courts in terms of two factors which calculate time to 
disposition.94 
Even when all of the information that the commissioners accumulated 
is considered together, it remains very difficult to conclude definitively 
whether specific circuits deliver appellate justice, function efficaciously 
or attain the appellate ideal, much less to identify measures which would 
clearly improve the courts. Although it may be impossible to determine 
with certainty that any regional circuit is not dispensing appellate justice, 
performing effectively or realizing the appellate ideal, the material above 
suggests that some courts seemingly work better than others and can 
support tentative recommendations regarding approaches which might 
enhance circuit operations. For example, an infusion of resources would 
apparently benefit those appeals courts that the comparison indicates do 
not function well. More specifically, the authorization of several 
additional judgeships for the Third, Fourth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits 
should enable each court to provide higher percentages of oral 
arguments and published opinions, to resolve cases more promptly, and 
to depend less substantially on visiting judges.95 
88 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.3. 
"' See id. at 95 tbl.7. 
90 See id. at 108 tbl.6a; see also Final Report, supra note 1, at 30 (suggesting that court 
may only have been able to operate this well because of contributions made by senior 
judges). 
•
1 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.2. 
92 See id. at 94 tbl.5. 
93 See id. at 93 tbl.1. 
94 See id. at 95 tbl.7. 
95 See supra notes 78-94 and accompanying text; infra notes 128-29, 160-61 and 
accompanying text. The resources should increase litigants' procedural opportunities and 
the justice delivered. Reduced reliance on visitors might address concerns about decreased 
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4. Other Insights on Specific Courts 
The information which the Commission gathered also affords 
instructive insights on particular appeals courts at the millennium. 
Much of this material confirms, reinforces or clarifies ideas that prior 
studies had elucidated. For instance, one informative analysis which the 
Commission authorized validated findings in the 1993 assessment 
performed by the Federal Judicial Center, even as the new examination 
did challenge some widely held views about appellate caseloads.% The 
evaluation determined that more filings in a few case types, rather than 
"broad increases in the willingness to appeal" have driven considerable 
docket growth, while the study found that upward drift, not a steep rise, 
characterized the trend in appeal rates and that there was no evident 
association between these rates and circuit size.97 
The Commission description correspondingly enhances 
comprehension of the appellate courts by reaffirming certain 
conventional wisdom related to the tribunals. For example, practically 
all of the circuits continue experiencing the caseload expansion which 
has transformed them over the last generation, employing diverse 
approaches when attempting to resolve appeals with insufficient 
resources and furnishing diminished procedural opportunities.98 Some 
variation does exist among the appellate courts, nonetheless. For 
instance, there are differences in terms of cases' complexity and the 
concomitant percentages of pro se filings; the rates at which dockets 
increase in the circuits; and the numbers of judges and administrative 
personnel as well as the facilities and related support that the courts 
have.99 
One clear impression which emerges from consulting the information 
that the Commission compiled is the diverse, and frequently creative, 
responses which the regional circuits have invoked to decide mounting 
appeals with comparatively scarce resources. Almost every court 
intracircuit consistency and collegiality that the Commission implicitly ascribed to Ninth 
Circuit dependence on visitors. See Final Report, supra note 1, at 39-40, 47-48. 
,. See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 127; see also MCKENNA, supra note 8 (affording 
earlier assessment). 
"' See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 133; see also id. at ii (listing other studies that 
Commission on Structural Alternatives commissioned, most of which are less relevant to 
this article) ). See generally CAROL l<RAFKA ET AL., STALKING THE INCREASE IN THE RATE OF 
CIVIL APPEALS (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1993). 
98 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
"' See, e.g., MCKENNA, supra note 8, at 31-32; Final Report, supra note 1, at 16 tbls.2-4 & 
2-5; at 24 tbl.2-8; at 27 tbl.2-9; Carl Tobias, Some Cautions About Structural Overhaul of the 
Federal Courts, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 389, 395 (1997). 
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addresses docket growth by relying on visiting judges and circuit staff, 
reducing the percentages of oral arguments and published opinions 
provided, using appellate management techniques and by employing a 
broad spectrum of other mechanisms.100 Yet, most of the appeals courts 
differ, often significantly, in their deployment of these measures. 
For example, in the 1997 fiscal year, 64 percent of Eleventh Circuit 
three-judge panels included at least one visiting participant, while the 
D.C. Circuit so comprised no panels.101 During this period, the Second 
Circuit heard oral arguments in 65 percent of the court's cases, even as 
the Third, Fourth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits entertained oral 
arguments in only 30 percent of their appeals.102 Moreover, the First 
Circuit published opinions in one-half of the court's cases, but the Fourth 
Circuit wrote published opinions for a mere 11 percent of its appeals and 
four other tribunals did so in fewer than 19 percent.103 
Appellate courts also differ widely in terms of the criteria that they 
apply in deciding whether to issue a published opinion, the weight 
which the tribunals accord published and unpublished determinations 
and the requirements that govern litigants' citation to unpublished 
dispositions.104 The circuits correspondingly invoke a plethora of 
measures in managing cases. For example, every court screens filings, 
principally to ascertain appeals' relative complexity and the concomitant 
procedural treatment which the cases will receive.105 In three circuits, 
judges undertake this duty, and the remaining courts assign central staff, 
employees in the clerk's office or the Circuit Executive the screening 
function. 106 All of the courts correspondingly rely on various alternatives 
to dispute resolution ("ADR"), but the options assume diverse forms. 
More circuits employ mediation or conference programs and a few 
courts use arbitration, while circuit staff have primary responsibility for 
100 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 21-25. See generally MCKENNA, supra note 8, at 38-
53; Grassley, supra note 87, at 8-10. 
101 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 108 tbl.6a; see also Final Report, supra note 1, at 
24 tbl.2-8 (showing disparities in circuit reliance on staff). 
102 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.2. 
103 See id. at tbl.3. The Third, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits published opinions for 
fewer than 19 percent of their appeals. See id. 
104 See id. at 110-16; see also Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 
OHIO ST. L. J. 177 (1999) (affording thorough exposition of these differences). 
105 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 102-04). See generally MCKENNA, supra note 8, at 
40-42; UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, CIVIL APPEALS 
MANAGEMENT PLAN (1999). 
106 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 104 tbl.2); see generally BAKER, supra note 43, at 
135-47; Tobias, supra note 7, at 230. 
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the administration of these alternatives in most courts.107 
B. Additional Lessons 
Numerous, other helpful lessons can be derived from the descriptive 
account that the Commission developed in compiling its report and 
suggestions. This section initially emphasizes a number of perspectives 
on the commissioners' work, and then explores several additional ideas, 
which may be gleaned from the description. 
l. Lessons From the Commission Work 
Certain observations below are implicitly mentioned throughout my 
earlier examination. The Commission probably achieved all that could 
be expected during the exceedingly short time that Congress prescribed. 
Lawmakers provided the entity twelve months for studying the entire 
appellate system and for writing its report and recommendations.108 One 
year was an extremely brief time-frame to complete an enormous 
assignment. For instance, some appeals courts require a longer period to 
resolve cases than the commissioners had for assessing the circuits.1()') 
The compressed time frame essentially precluded the systematic 
collection, analysis and synthesis of considerable empirical data on how 
the courts address specific appeals from filing to disposition. 
This temporal constraint might indicate why the information which 
the commissioners did assemble cannot support particularly definitive 
conclusions respecting individual circuits or the appellate system. Most 
of that material, especially the information which ostensibly underlies 
the Commission decision making, seemingly lacks important attributes, 
namely the requisite comprehensiveness, refinement or 
"" See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 102. See generally JAMES B. EAGLIN, THE PRE-
ARGUMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM IN Tiffi SIXrn CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS: AN 
EVALUATION (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1990); ROBERT NIEMIC, MEDIATION AND CONFERENCE 
PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1997). Some circuit-specific 
empirical and other relevant material included in the Commission description might apply 
to the appellate system. However, the description's implications for that system warrant 
minimal analysis here principally because much systemic information lacks applicable 
measures for comparison that are analogous to those used in contrasting circuit-specific 
objective data. Little of that data or certain subjective Commission information were, or 
can be, computed systemically. Examples are the national averages. Even this material 
must be compared with previously assembled information, much of which is unrelated to 
the Commission study. 
"" See Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 
305(a)(l)(B), 111Stat.2491 (1997). 
109 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. 
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contextualization, that would permit very conclusive determinations. 
The above ideas may explain the fundamental deficiencies in the 
Commission's work. Those problems are the failure to identify the exact 
aspects of Ninth Circuit operations, which prompted the Commission's 
recommendation of the divisional arrangement, and how this approach 
would constitute improvement. More specifically, the Commission 
members did not answer with clarity three questions. First, the 
Commission did not answer how a court must perform to be working 
inefficaciously and, thus, warrant remediation. Second, the Commission 
did not explicate precisely why it found that the Ninth Circuit so 
functions. Third, the Commission did not show expressly how the 
solution proposed would rectify any inadequacies detected and enhance 
the court's operations. Despite these complications, lessons can be 
extracted from the commissioners' effort by examining what they 
actually said, by drawing reasonable inferences from the material which 
the Commission gathered and the suggestions which it proffered. It is 
also informative to assume that the Commission collected sufficient 
empirical data, which demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit operates 
ineffectively enough to justify treatment and that the reform prescribed 
would be responsive. 
The commissioners apparently relied on several perceptions for their 
central recommendations that Congress require the Ninth Circuit to 
institute a divisional organization and authorize the remaining appeals 
courts to adopt divisional structures when they exceed a particular size. 
The Commission seemingly believed that appellate courts, which have 
more than fifteen active judges, experience difficulty maintaining 
uniform, coherent and predictable circuit law as well as judicial 
collegiality.110 The commissioners apparently thought that these 
circumstances prevail in the Ninth Circuit, which has twenty-eight active 
members; that the tribunal's limited en bane mechanism undermines 
consistency, coherence and predictability; and that the court's gigantic 
geographic magnitude erodes the positive features of regionalism.111 
However, the Commission did not clearly articulate those ideas. Most 
of what it explicitly stated, especially regarding the existence of the 
phenomena above, lacked sufficient empirical verification, and the 
entity provided few specific findings about the Ninth Circuit's condition. 
For example, the commissioners frankly admitted that they had 
110 See Final Report, supra note 1, at iii, ix-xi, 29-30, 47-49; see also supra text 
accompanying note 49. See generally Hellman, supra note 4, at 393-401. 
111 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 30-31, 35-41, 50-53. 
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inadequate time for conducting a statistically meaningful analysis of 
Ninth Circuit decision making to reach an objective determination of 
how the court compares with others. The commissioners eventually 
concluded that uniformity and predictability defy statistical evaluation.112 
Nonetheless, the comrmss10ners essentially depended on their 
unsubstantiated, personal judgments for the critical proposition that the 
"consistent, predictable, coherent development of the law over time is 
best fostered in a decisional unit that is small enough" to be collegial.113 
The commissioners acknowledged that this notion "cannot be quantified 
or measured."114 The Commission concomitantly asserted that the 
divisional concept would promote uniform, coherent and predictable 
circuit law, judicial collegiality and regional linkages,115 but those 
contentions were almost exclusively justificatory and were nearly devoid 
of empirical support. Indeed, there was no showing that the divisional 
proposal, which appeals courts have never applied, would improve the 
situations of the Ninth Circuit or the remaining courts. Insofar as these 
perceptions actually animated the divisional scheme, the ideas on which 
the commissioners seemingly depended the most received the least 
empirical substantiation. 
The Commission report and working papers included additional 
material which undercut, and even contravened, the Commission's 
recommendations. The commissioners explicitly observed that they 
found none of the circuits functions inefficaciously, much less fails to 
deliver justice.116 After canvassing "all of the available objective data 
routinely used in court administration to measure [circuit] performance 
and efficiency," the Commission could not say that these "statistical 
criteria tip decisively in one direction or the other."117 The Commission 
stated that "while there are differences among the courts of appeals, 
differences in judicial vacancy rates, caseload mix, and operating 
procedures make it impossible to attribute them to any single factor such 
as size."118 Indeed, several important indicia - the percentages of oral 
arguments and published opinions afforded as well as the number of 
dispositions per authorized judgeship - on which the commissioners 
112 See id. at 39; see also supra text accompanying notes 49-50. 
113 Final Report, supra note 1, at 40. 
11
• Id.(stating that commissioners made "no attempt to do so" for any circuit); see supra 
text accompanying notes 50-51 (elaborating textual ideas). 
115 See Final Report, supra note 1, at iii, 47-50. 
11
• See id. at 29; see also supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. 
117 Final Report, supra note 1, at 39 
11
• Id.; see also supra notes 36, 48 and accompanying text. 
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collected objective, empirical data specifically suggest that the Ninth 
Circuit performs better than numerous other courts.119 However, the 
Commission apparently ignored these figures, as witnessed by the 
minimal discussion accorded them in the Commission's report. A few 
admissions related to the subjective information which the 
commissioners consulted are practically as revealing. Most crucial was 
the Commission members' candid acknowledgement: "when all is said 
and done [no one] can reduce consistency and predictability to statistical 
analysis. These concepts are too subtle, the decline in quality too 
incremental, and the effects of size too difficult to isolate, to allow 
evaluation in a freeze-framed moment."120 The survey conducted by the 
Commission correspondingly showed that Ninth Circuit district judges 
"report finding the law insufficiently clear to give them confidence in 
their decisions on questions of law about as often as their counterparts in 
other circuits. "121 
In short, the Commission assembled some objective, empirical data 
and relatively little subjective material. However, the Commission did 
not designate exactly how an appellate court must operate to function 
ineffectively and, therefore, deserve remediation. The commissioners 
also delineated with little clarity why they decided that the Ninth Circuit 
performs so inefficaciously as to require treatment, and how the 
divisional approach would improve any deficiencies found. Vague, 
unsupported generalizations, subjective perceptions and personal 
opinions cannot replace empirical data that have been systematically 
gathered, assessed and synthesized. 
In fairness, the severe time restraints under which the Commission 
labored may explain the Commission's collection of minimal empirical 
information and its substantial reliance on subjective material. The 
serious time restraints might concomitantly indicate why the 
Commission report includes several, significant findings that seem to 
contradict the entity's recommendations. For example, the 
commissioners' conclusion that all appeals courts operate effectively and 
their corresponding rejection of circuit-splitting for any of the courts,122 
contradicts the commissioners' apparent belief that the Ninth Circuit 
11
• See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbls.1-3. 
120 Final Report, supra note 1, at 40; see also supra text accompanying note 50. 
121 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 39-40. The judges do have certain problems with 
"inconsistencies between published and unpublished opinions," while "lawyers in the 
Ninth Circuit report somewhat more difficulty discerning circuit law and predicting 
outcomes" than attorneys elsewhere. Id. 
122 See id. at iii, ix-xi, 29. 
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works less efficaciously than the court could because the commissioners 
proposed a solution which would essentially divide the circuit. 
Certain determinations discussed previously also are difficult to make 
and may well resist particularly precise empirical verification. For 
instance, assembling empirical data on the divisional arrangement, let 
alone demonstrating its effectiveness, would have been virtually 
impossible because no appellate court has implemented the concept. 
Nearly as problematic are the efforts to define, detect and measure the 
inconsistency, incoherence, and unpredictability of circuit law, the lack 
of judicial collegiality and, if any of the attributes exists, ascertaining 
definitively whether judicial collegiality correlates with a court's size. 
Equally vexing is the concomitant attempt to pinpoint confidently the 
optimal number of active judgeships for a regional circuit. That inquiry, 
which seemed integral to the Commission's suggestions,123 implicates a 
diverse mix of comparatively abstract phenomena that can vary among 
the courts and across time. These factors include the aforementioned 
uniformity, coherence, predictability and judicial collegiality; local legal 
culture, traditions and practices; judicial reliance on circuit staff; as well 
as the meaning of appellate justice and opinions about how best to 
deliver justice. Indeed, the judges of the appeals courts vociferously 
disagree over this issue and have participated in vigorous, ongoing 
debate related to size.124 For example, most current members of the 
Ninth Circuit believe that the court performs efficaciously with twenty-
eight active judges, and some even declare publicly that it would 
function as well having a larger judicial complement.125 In sharp 
contrast, a majority of active members on the Third, Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits has officially urged Congress to authorize no additional 
judgeships for their courts.126 Finally, it is important to remember the 
mid-1970s recommendation by the Hruska Commission, which 
conducted a comprehensive study of the circuits, and the Judicial 
Conference, the policymaking arm of the federal courts, that nine be the 
123 See supra notes 110-111, 114 and accompanying text. 
"' Compare Jon 0. Newman, 1000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Judiciary, 76 
JUDICATURE 187 (1993) with Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases: A Plea to 
Save the Federal Courts, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52. See generally GoROON BERMANT ET AL., 
lMPosING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES: ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS 
AND IMPLICATIONS (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1993), available at http://www.fjc.gov/JUDJUDACT I 
impomora/ impomora.pdf. 
125 See Tobias, supra note 7, at 1364; Reinhardt, supra note 124; Hug Interview, supra note 
46. 
126 See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 8, at 
44. 
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maximum number for a circuit.121 The suggestion is a trenchant reminder 
of how dramatically the increase in caseloads has altered modern 
thinking about the appellate courts and transformed them because today 
eleven of the twelve regional circuits have at least twelve active judges.128 
The complexity of these determinations are not underestimated. 
Despite the significant complications entailed, evaluators could secure 
considerably better data than the Commission accumulated and 
correspondingly posit more definitive conclusions about whether and, if 
so, why any appeals court operates ineffectively enough to warrant 
remediation as well as identify responsive solutions.129 Professor Arthur 
Hellman's careful, decade-long work which involves intracircuit 
consistency typifies the type of meticulous effort that evaluators might 
undertake.130 A recent study by Professor Tracey George of three 
appellate courts' reliance on the en bane device concomitantly shows 
how to analyze use of this measure in other tribunals and indicates how 
to evaluate Ninth Circuit employment of the limited en bane technique.131 
The examinations of the appellate system which the Federal Judicial 
Center finished during 1993 and that the Hruska Commission completed 
a quarter century ago illustrate the kind of comprehensive, refined 
assessment which I envision.132 
127 See Hruska Commission, supra note 26, at 231-32; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 48 (1974). In 
fairness, the courts began experiencing the docket growth that transformed them in the 
1970s. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
128 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 27 tbl.2-9. 
129 It is important to appreciate that even some commission material, such as raw data 
on dockets, which is useful, would benefit from refinement and specificity, while 
evaluators will need to collect, analyze and synthesize much supplemental or new 
empirical data. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text. 
130 See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the I.aw of the Large Circuit, in 
RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 55-90 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990); Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking 
the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 ARiz. ST. L.J. 915 (1991) 
[hereinafter Hellman, Breaking the Banc]; Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: 
The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 541 (1989) 
[hereinafter Hellman, Jumboism]. The book REsTRUCTURING JUSTICE is essentially a study. 
See infra note 134. 
131 See Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc 
Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999). See generally Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The 
Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REY. 1008 (1991); Michael Solimine, Ideology and 
En Banc Review, 67 N.C.L. REY. 29 (1988). There are two recent, similar studies of the 
Fourth Circuit. See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges 
at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1037, 1111 (2000); Phil Zarone, Agenda Setting on the 
Courts of Appeals: The Effect of Ideology on En Banc Rehearings, 2 J. APP. PRACT. & PROC. 157 
(2000). 
132 See MCKENNA, supra note 8; Hruska Commission, supra note 26. Even the FJC study 
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Finally, the Commission's endeavors demonstrate that those who 
perform future analyses of the circuits must have adequate resources, 
especially temporal ones, if the work is to support conclusive 
determinations respecting the appeals courts and important public 
policymaking which significantly affects the tribunals. The 
commissioners' efforts suggest that they had insufficient time to 
complete the substantial assignment, even though Congress budgeted 
ample monetary resources. This paper does not criticize the 
Commission, which apparently achieved as much as is reasonable to 
expect in the limited period available. However, the Commission might 
have expended the generous financial resources which Congress 
provided differently. For instance, the Commission could have 
deployed legal scholars to conduct empirical evaluations that involved 
uniformity, coherence, predictability, collegiality and regionalism. 
a. Miscellany of Lessons 
Additional lessons which implicate the commissioners' work 
somewhat less directly can be derived from the Commission's 
descriptive account of the twelve regional circuits. This description 
enhances understanding of individual appellate courts. The 
Commission's descriptive account simultaneously teaches how little 
even astute federal courts observers actually understand, and how much 
more lawmakers, the federal judiciary and the nation need to know, 
about particular circuits and the courts as a whole at the century's end. 
This is true, although the Commission's study is the fourth important 
assessment that encompassed the circuits during the last decade, and 
there have been approximately fifteen analyses of these courts since the 
1970s. 
One valuable means by which the commissioners' description 
improves appreciation is confirming the conventional wisdom related to 
the circuits.133 For example, the Commission's descriptive account 
reaffirms that the appellate courts continue to have rather scarce 
resources for confronting increased appeals, which they resolve in 
myriad ways. The circuits specifically apply numerous, innovative 
measures when attempting to deliver justice, to function efficaciously 
was rather narrow, albeit broader than the other two major analyses in the last decade 
because they did not emphasize the circuits. See FEDERAL COURTS STIJDY REPORT, supra 
note 8; LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 8; see also infra note 141 and accompanying text 
(mentioning thorough, refined study of federal districts). 
133 See supra text accompanying note 98. 
576 University of California, Davis [Vol. 34:549 
and to attain the appellate ideal. However, the courts accord lawyers 
and litigants fewer procedural opportunities, especially in the form of 
oral arguments and published opinions. 
The Commission's description enhances comprehension of local legal 
culture, a construct which evaluators have heretofore employed 
principally in scrutinizing criminal law and trial courts.134 For instance, 
the descriptive account indicates that individual circuits follow certain 
practices and traditions, particularly to address multiplying dockets 
promptly, inexpensively and fairly with deficient funding. More 
specifically, those courts, such as the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, which 
have larger caseloads, rely substantially on visiting judges and on non-
judicial court personnel. Other circuits, namely the D.C and Seventh 
Circuits, practically never depend on visiting judges and may employ 
staff less.135 The Second Circuit correspondingly hears oral arguments in 
a high percentage of appeals, including many cases which pro se 
litigants pursue, while the First and Seventh Circuits write published 
opinions in a significant percentage of appeals. 136 These propositions 
might mean that the notion of local legal culture has greater applicability 
to the appellate courts than some observers previously thought. 
Certain aspects of the Commission's descriptive account show that the 
idea of the regional circuit could have declining relevance, although the 
commissioners partially premised the divisional recommendation on 
their concern that the Ninth Circuit maintains inadequate linkages with 
the geographic areas which it serves.137 For example, manifestations of 
the regional circuit's decreasing applicability are expanding 
internationalization, increasing reliance on computerization by every 
appeals court and on visiting appellate and district judges by most 
tribunals, as well as growing tensions between the notions of 
regionalism and federalization - the circuit duty to reconcile federal law 
with local policies.138 
1
" See Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy: Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DuKE 
L.J. 929, 945-47 (1996); Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the 
Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 603, 614 (1989); Carl Tobias, 
Civil Justice Reform Sunset, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 527, 602-03. See generally THOMAS W. 
CHURCH ET AL., JUSTICE DELA YEO: THE PACE OF LmGA TION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978). 
135 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 24 tbl.2-8; Working Papers, supra note 6, at 108 
tbl.6a; see also supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
136 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.2 (dealing with oral arguments), tbl.3 
(dealing with published opinions); supra notes 46,47,74-75, 102, 106 and accompanying text; 
see also George, supra note 131 (suggesting how circuits use en bane measure). 
137 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 36, 49-50; see also Spreng, supra note 4, at 571-76. 
138 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHf, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 10-13 (5th ed. 1994); John 
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In sum, the above analysis of the Commission's description indicates 
that particular courts may be operating less effectively than they could. 
However, the empirical data which the Commission collected cannot 
support definitive conclusions respecting the circuits' present 
circumstances or the Commission's proposals, most importantly the 
divisional concept. The last section, accordingly, offers suggestions for 
the future that members of Congress and the federal appellate judiciary 
should carefully evaluate. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
There are several reasons why the recommendations which lawmakers 
and judges ought to consider deserve relatively little examination in this 
article. First and foremost, the evidence adduced by the commissioners 
does not permit very conclusive determinations about individual courts 
and, thus, precise suggestions for future action. Second, even if the 
information that the Commission elicited might yield more certain 
findings related to specific circuits, numerous recommendations have 
been rather comprehensively explored elsewhere.139 Nevertheless, the 
material which the commissioners assembled - especially together with 
insights derived from prior assessments, such as the three major efforts 
during the last decade140 - can allow some suggestions that complement 
or elaborate the recommendations proffered earlier. The prescriptions 
below implicate additional study, which could provide more definitive 
conclusions about the appeals courts, continuing and new 
experimentation with mechanisms that have been, or may prove, 
efficacious, and a miscellany of other suggestions which might improve 
the circuits. 
The analysis throughout this article demonstrates that Congress 
should not adopt the centerpiece of the Commission recommendations. 
The commissioners produced insufficient empirical data which clearly 
show that the current condition of any appellate court is troubling 
enough to deserve remediation, particularly with a solution which could 
be as disruptive as the untested divisional arrangement appears. Indeed, 
the Commission frankly admitted that it found that all of the circuits 
perform effectively. 
Minor Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 LoY. L. REv. 787, 788 (1980). 
,,. See, e.g., Hug, supra note 3, at 908-09; Spreng, supra note 4, at 586-98; Tobias, supra 
note 4, at 313-18. 
"
0 See sources cited supra note 8. 
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These propositions might lead Congress and the appeals courts to 
exercise caution, but the ideas do not necessarily mean that legislators or 
appellate judges must avoid all action. For instance, consideration of the 
Commission information, in combination with previously gathered 
material, may enable lawmakers to prescribe greater study; 
experimentation with salutary measures, including some Commission 
proposals; and additional constructive approaches. The courts' 
consultation of the information in the sentence above, closer examination 
of their own situations, and increased exploration of the remaining 
courts' circumstances, especially efficacious responses by tribunals to 
docket growth, could concomitantly enhance circuit operations. For 
example, appeals courts might modify the practices which they presently 
follow, test or implement potentially effective mechanisms. In the end, 
Congress and the appellate judiciary may simply lack the knowledge 
that they need to institute action which is more ambitious than 
continued study and selective experimentation. 
A. Additional Study 
1. An Introductory Word 
There will never be perfect information on the federal intermediate 
appeals courts. Nonetheless, evaluators could collect, scrutinize and 
synthesize empirical data that are superior to the material which the 
Commission accumulated. Superior data should permit more certain 
determinations regarding the regional circuits. However, evaluators 
must have adequate resources, particularly time, to perform rigorous 
analysis by carefully structuring study and by assembling, examining 
and synthesizing the requisite empirical data which will yield 
sufficiently definitive conclusions. Evaluators should also consult and 
capitalize upon the Commission's contributions and prior endeavors, 
especially the ones that the commissioners essentially continued. These 
prior efforts afford considerable, helpful information and numerous, 
instructive perspectives on the appellate courts and on the conduct of 
future work. An expert, independent entity, such as the RAND 
Corporation, which recently completed a comprehensive assessment of 
expense and delay reduction procedures in 94 federal districts, 141 should 
141 See, e.g., JAMES s. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT 
UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PrLoT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS (1996); JAMES S. 
KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILar AND 
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have primary responsibility for this activity. All twelve circuits might 
correspondingly undertake introspection while drawing upon the 
experiences in other appeals courts. For instance, Chief Judge Hug 
appointed a Ninth Circuit Evaluation Committee to reconsider 
numerous dimensions of the court's performance in light of the 
Commission report and proposals and to develop constructive 
suggestions for improvement.142 
2. Specific Suggestions 
Evaluators must carefully gather, analyze and synthesize the 
maximum empirical data which will permit them to ascertain as 
conclusively as possible whether any circuit does not deliver appellate 
justice, operate efficaciously or attain the appellate ideal.143 Of course, 
evaluators should allow for the possibility that every appeals courts now 
works effectively, a finding which the commissioners expressly made, 
even though the commissioners prescribed a divisional arrangement for 
the Ninth Circuit. If the evaluators definitively determine that a court is 
deficient, they must attempt to identify exactly why this situation came 
about and to designate the best approaches for rectifying or ameliorating 
the problems detected. In short, evaluators should essentially finish the 
ongoing inquiry which the commissioners continued. 
The Commission endeavor might serve as a starting point. However, 
evaluators must institute numerous, additional efforts if they are to 
complete the project that the Commission started. Most of the empirical 
data which the commissioners systematically collected, examined and 
synthesized will be helpful, but evaluators should scrutinize some of this 
data and additional material. Insofar as evaluators find that the 
information is insufficient, evaluators will need to particularize or refine 
it, or assemble, analyze and synthesize supplemental or new empirical 
data. 
The raw numerical material on dockets is a general example of 
information which may require refinement. The total number of cases 
COMPARISON COURTS (1996); see also Tobias, supra note 134 at 602. 
142 See Oversight Hearings on the Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives 
for the Federal Courts of Appeals Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and 
Intellectual Property (July 22, 1999) (statement of Judge David Thompson, Judge, Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings]; Ninth Circuit Evaluation 
Committee, Interim Report (Mar. 2000) [hereinafter Interim Report]. 
,., I emphasize appellate justice and efficacious operation for the reasons stated supra 
notes 42-44 and accompanying text. These suggestions are primarily meant for expert, 
independent evaluators, but specific courts can also apply them. 
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that each regional circuit receives and processes is somewhat useful. 
However, it would be instructive to know more about the filings' 
relative complexity, beyond how many appeals prose litigants pursue.144 
Evaluators could concomitantly augment the material which the 
commissioners collected on the absolute quantity of cases that every 
appellate court accords en bane rehearing by. For instance, ascertaining 
reconsideration's frequency and whether it suffices to maintain 
consistency, coherence and predictability.145 Evaluators might also 
develop new empirical data on collegiality and regionalism with, for 
example, interviews of judges.146 
Evaluators must determine as conclusively as possible whether any of 
the regional circuits fails to provide appellate justice or to operate 
efficaciously. Evaluators, accordingly, should delineate precisely how a 
court must function by examining specified indicia to determine with 
confidence that the circuit performs in an unsatisfactory manner, thereby 
triggering remediation. This is a polycentric problem which will require 
a carefully calibrated qualitative and quantitative analysis as well as the 
exercise of discerning judgment. 
The objective criteria can be treated rather felicitously because the raw 
numerical data offer a readily available standard of comparison. For 
instance, relevant information on every court could be considered with 
reference to the national average and the operations of the remaining 
circuits. However, these efforts must be contextualized. They will only 
be valuable, to the extent that evaluators similarly calculate the 
numerical material by identifying, isolating and allowing for applicable 
variables. illustrative are the percentages of oral arguments and 
published opinions afforded as well as disposition times, which resist 
meaningful comparison absent provision for case complexity. 
Once evaluators have placed this information in context, they must 
confront additional, difficult issues. For example, exactly how small a 
percentage of oral arguments or published opinions is too few and 
precisely how long an appeals process is too inexpeditious? Evaluators 
might answer these questions by comparing a particular appeals court's 
, .. See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbl.1; supra text accompanying note 38. It 
would also be beneficial to know more precisely which types of cases receive oral 
arguments and published opinions and how courts deploy staff, manage appeals and use 
ADR. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text. 
"
5 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 94 tbl.6. For more analysis of these ideas, see 
infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text. 
146 For more analysis of these ideas, see infra notes 148-49, 158 and accompanying text. 
They as well might develop supplemental or new data on consistency, coherence and 
predictability. See infra notes 147, 153-57 and accompanying text. 
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record with the national average and the endeavors of the other eleven 
circuits. The system-wide average could serve as a benchmark or 
threshold for closer analysis, while a performance that is substantially 
less than the national average or that is in the bottom quartile of 
appellate courts might necessitate further inquiry. 
At this juncture, evaluators should ask two questions: 1) exactly how 
should a circuit function; and (2) what number of which types of 
parameters would enable assessors' to ascertain confidently whether a 
circuit is deficient. These determinations will require finely tuned 
qualitative and quantitative consideration of relevant indicia as well as 
identification of the reasons for any inadequacies found. The qualitative 
aspect of the exercise would involve, for instance, how a court works 
with reference to the remaining circuits and the relative significance of 
individual criteria. More specifically, a court which compiles numerical 
records that are much lower than most circuits in terms of factors, such 
as the percentages of oral arguments or published opinions, which are 
important to appellate justice, will deserve additional scrutiny. The 
quantitative dimension would implicate, for example, the way that a 
court operates compared to the other circuits in terms of certain factors. 
More particularly, a court whose numbers are strikingly worse than a 
majority of circuits for numerous factors will warrant closer examination. 
In definitively deciding whether a performance which appeared 
insufficient actually was, evaluators must also attempt to delineate 
precisely why the court functions as it does. For instance, a circuit that 
needs much time to resolve appeals, because it furnishes a high 
percentage of oral arguments and published opinions, could be 
operating satisfactorily. If slow case treatment can be explained by the 
provision of many oral arguments and published opinions, these large 
figures should be permitted to offset inexpeditious resolution, while 
diverse approaches to appellate disposition, especially ones which 
promote court access, might also be acceptable. 
Evaluators should similarly address the subjective criteria. That 
inquiry is much more complex, as the indicia are rather amorphous and 
evaluators will essentially lack the type of raw numerical data which 
facilitate comparison of objective information. However, evaluators 
might ask, and attempt to answer, analogous questions. These include 
whether any court produces disuniform, incoherent or unpredictable 
circuit law, whether the court's judges are uncollegial and if so, why, and 
what amount of each attribute together or alone would mean that a 
circuit is deficient. Evaluators could generally monitor the court's 
appeals from filing to disposition in particular areas of law over a period 
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of time. Professor Hellman's detailed examination of consistency and its 
possible correlation with circuit magnitude specifically shows how 
evaluators might proceed.147 The endeavors of numerous appellate 
judges have correspondingly enhanced comprehension of collegiality,148 
although evaluators must undertake considerably more work. For 
example, evaluators could personally interview appeals court judges or 
closely study circuit operations, such as how the courts constitute panels 
and assign administrative duties to active circuit judges.149 
After evaluators have thoroughly reviewed the relevant objective and 
subjective material, evaluators must consider the information in reaching 
overall determinations whether a court does not dispense appellate 
justice or function effectively and, therefore, warrants treatment. 
Evaluators should carefully differentiate the two judgments and 
recognize that a circuit which clearly delivers appellate justice may not 
necessarily operate efficaciously. For instance, a court that performs at a 
level which is substantially below the national average, absent adequate 
justification, even as to one parameter, could be working ineffectively. If 
evaluators entertain doubts about any circuit's circumstances at this 
point, evaluators might want to explore the advisability of further study 
and fruitful means of conducting that analysis, perhaps in conjunction 
with experimentation and the miscellany of ideas discussed below.150 
Should evaluators conclusively find that a circuit functions in an 
unsatisfactory way, evaluators must designate with precision why. 
Answering the question of why a court functions unsatisfactorily will 
foster the narrow tailoring of remedies to the specific problems 
identified. Evaluators could then formulate the finest solutions. Those 
will be measures which respond most efficaciously to the difficulties 
delineated while imposing the fewest disadvantages. 
Several examples should clarify the approach contemplated. A circuit 
that works well, or convincingly explains any failure to so operate, vis-a-
vis all of the applicable objective and subjective parameters, obviously 
affords appellate justice and performs effectively and, therefore, will 
147 See supra note 130 and accompanying text; see also supra note 131; infra note 157 and 
accompanying text (suggesting that Professor George's recent study of en bane measure 
shows how to analyze its possible effect on consistency, coherence and predictability). 
148 See, e.g., FRANK COFFIN, ON APPEAL 215 (1994); Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and 
Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1358-62 (1998); Deanell Reece 
Tacha, The "C" Word: On Collegiality, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 585 (1995). 
149 I realize that the Commission did ask the judges about collegiality. See Working 
Papers, supra note 6, at 15-35; supra note 110 and accompanying text. I envision more 
intensive scrutiny. 
150 See infra notes 162-79 and accompanying text. 
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require no remediation. In contrast, a court which functions badly, 
without sufficient reason, in terms of numerous, important objective 
indicia, such as the percentages of oral arguments furnished and time to 
disposition, or subjective criteria, namely inconsistent and incoherent 
circuit law, may not dispense justice and, therefore, does work 
inefficaciously. It, thus, might deserve comparatively drastic solutions, 
perhaps including structural reforms like the divisional arrangement, or 
at least correctives for ineffective performance. Evaluators will probably 
find that most courts operate between these polar opposites. For 
example, a circuit which functions rather poorly, while offering 
somewhat persuasive justifications based on several objective factors, 
such as percentages of published opinions produced or of visiting judges 
employed, but works relatively well in terms of many subjective 
parameters, namely predictability and collegiality, could provide justice, 
yet perform inefficaciously. The court, therefore, may need modest 
changes, including the authorization of a few additional judgeships. 
I can also illustrate the inquiry envisioned by applying the approach to 
the Ninth Circuit, the only appeals court that Congress instructed the 
commissioners to emphasize and that the Commission apparently 
decided was operating ineffectively enough to warrant treatment. 
Evaluators must determine as definitively as feasible whether the Ninth 
Circuit does not deliver appellate justice or function efficaciously. 
Evaluators might initially want to examine the raw data and other 
information that the Commission accumulated, although as the analysis 
in the second section suggests, this material alone will not suffice. 
Evaluators could specifically consider objective data, namely the 
percentages of oral arguments and published opinions which the Ninth 
Circuit affords and its time to disposition. However, evaluators must 
refine and contextualize the numerical information that the Commission 
collected. For instance, the percentages and disposition times might be 
calibrated with case complexity, while all of these statistics should allow 
for the large number of judicial vacancies on the court since 1995.151 
Indeed, one critical question which must be answered is whether Ninth 
Circuit operation absent one-fourth of its active judges contributed to 
any deficiencies that the Commission seemingly found. Moreover, 
evaluators could gather, analyze and synthesize supplemental or new 
empirical material, such as information on the uniformity, coherence and 
predictability of circuit law as well as on judicial collegiality. 
'" See supra notes 38, 40-41, 144 and accompanying text. 
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Evaluators may also attempt to ascertain the accuracy of the 
perceptions on which the commissioners apparently premised their 
decision making, as well as additional subjective criteria related to the 
Ninth Circuit, even though the above discussion detailed the problems 
in detecting exactly how the Commission reached its judgments and in 
applying subjective factors. 152 Notwithstanding these complications, 
evaluators may institute some efforts. For example, evaluators ought to 
determine as conclusively as possible whether circuit law is actually 
inconsistent, incoherent or unpredictable and whether the court's judges 
are uncollegial. If any of these phenomena exist, evaluators should 
assess whether they can be ascribed to circuit magnitude. Evaluators 
should consult, and build upon, earlier, reliable endeavors. illustrative is 
a well-respected, scholarly study of uniformity which found that the 
pattern of multiple relevant precedents "exemplified by high visibility 
issues ... is not characteristic of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence generally. 
Nor is intracircuit conflict."153 During 1993, a Federal Judicial Center 
analysis similarly found "little evidence that intracircuit inconsistency is 
a significant problem [or] that whatever intracircuit conflict exists is 
strongly correlated with circuit size."154 Similarly, the Appellate Practice 
Committee of the American Bar Association Litigation Section detected 
"no evidence that a larger circuit necessarily causes significantly more 
intracircuit conflicts than a circuit of ten to fifteen judges. "155 
Evaluators could correspondingly scrutinize the Ninth Circuit's 
limited en bane procedure to ascertain whether it affects uniformity, 
coherence or predictability, and if so, precisely how. Evaluators might 
specifically attempt to verify some commentators' contention that the 
rather infrequent invocation of this mechanism has failed to preserve 
consistency and coherence.156 Professor George's recent work suggests 
how evaluators could analyze the court's use of the limited en bane 
152 See supra notes 110-15, 120-121 and accompanying text. 
153 See Arthur D.Hellman, Introduction: Adjudication: Efficiency without Depersonalization, 
in REsTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 130, at 86; see also MCKENNA, supra note 8, at 94 
(characterizing scholarly study as "only systematic study of precedent in a large circuit"). 
15
' See MCKENNA, supra note 8, at 94. 
155 See id.; SUBCOMM. TO STUDY CIRCUIT SIZE, A.B.A., REl'ORT ON FEDERAL CIRCUIT SIZE 
(1993); see also supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing how to analyze 
collegiality). 
156 See supra note 110 and accompanying text; Oversight Hearings, supra note 142 
(statements of Ass't Atty. Gen. Eleanor Dean Acheson & Sen. Dianne Feinstein); see also 
Interim Report, supra note 142, at 5-6 (finding "apparent change in the court's en bane 
culture" leading to more en bane cases and quarterly hearings to facilitate them); infra note 
159 and accompanying text. 
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process.157 Evaluators also might examine whether Ninth Circuit 
magnitude has eroded regionalism and, if so, whether the concept 
retains modem salience, especially given increasing globalization, 
computerization and tensions between regionalism and the court's 
responsibility for federalization.158 
Once evaluators have collected, analyzed and synthesized the 
maximum, relevant empirical data and additional applicable material, 
the evaluators must decide as definitively as possible whether the Ninth 
Circuit fails to provide appellate justice or perform effectively. Should 
evaluators remain uncertain at this juncture, evaluators could consider 
more study of the court, perhaps together with experimentation and the 
other ideas which are explored below. If evaluators conclusively 
determine that the Ninth Circuit fails to deliver justice or function 
efficaciously, they must comprehensively identify why either occurs and 
match solutions with the problems delineated. Respecting the provision 
of justice, should evaluators clearly ascertain that the court's size fosters 
disuniform, incoherent and unpredictable circuit law, which the limited 
en bane device exacerbates, absent justification, these findings' gravity 
may indicate dramatic or structural measures, including the divisional 
scheme. As to ineffective operation, if evaluators confidently conclude 
that the limited en bane technique does not promote consistency, 
coherence and predictability, adjustments, such as enlarging the en bane 
membership, might be warranted.159 
Evaluators could apply a similar approach to appeals courts apart 
from the Ninth Circuit. Should resource limitations preclude replicating 
the inquiry for all of the circuits, evaluators might focus on those courts 
which the Commission report suggests experience the most difficulty. 
For example, the Third, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits perform least well 
in terms of certain, important objective parameters, namely the 
percentages of oral arguments and published opinions provided as well 
157 See George, supra note 131; see also Hellman, REsTRUCUTING JUSTICE, supra note 130 at 
62-78 (analyzing Ninth Circuit's use of limited en bane process); Hug, supra note 3, at 907-
09. 
158 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. Evaluators might correlate panel 
assignments with the regions where judges are stationed and appeals arise, but the court's 
recent decision to authorize experimentation with panels that include one resident judge 
from the region producing the appeal may obviate the need for this exercise. See infra note 
166 and accompanying text. 
159 See S. 1043, 106th Cong. (1999); see also supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text. Of 
course, the court's actual condition and possible need for treatment may differ from the 
two examples. 
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as the number of visiting judges deployed. 160 Evaluators must attempt to 
determine with certainty whether and, if so, why any of the courts 
actually do not afford appellate justice or work efficaciously and, thus, 
needs remediation.161 
B. Experimentation 
1. An Introductory Word 
There are several reasons why recommendations for experimentation 
deserve comparatively limited exploration in this article. First, the 
analysis above indicates that it is preferable to undertake additional 
study, because studies of the circuits should permit more definitive 
conclusions related to the appeals courts and facilitate future testing and 
reform. Second, numerous suggestions have been rather 
comprehensively examined elsewhere,162 while recommendations could 
be derived from the Ninth Circuit or the other courts that have 
participated in experimentation. For example, the Ninth Circuit has 
been the acknowledged national leader in employing many, creative 
measures to address docket expansion with rather scarce resources. 
Nonetheless, certain prescriptions can be proffered, as sufficient 
information currently exists to structure productive testing, which might 
proceed at the same time as further study. Moreover, the circuits could 
always experiment with promising approaches and ought to continue 
applying effective concepts, such as varied alternatives to dispute 
resolution and diverse forms of appeals management. 163 This activity 
would promote better court administration, increase comprehension of 
the tribunals and foster the exchange of beneficial ideas. 
160 See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbls.2 & 3, 108 tbl.6a; see also supra notes 78-82 
and accompanying text. 
161 When conducting this exercise, evaluators might also ascertain whether suggestions 
for improvement can be derived from studying circuits which appear to function rather 
well or ineffectively. For example, it would be valuable to know exactly how the First 
Circuit writes such a high percentage of published opinions, how the Seventh Circuit relies 
so little on visiting judges, and how the Eleventh Circuit terminates such a large number of 
appeals per authorized judgeship. In contrast, why do the Third, Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits generate the smallest percentages of published opinions and why are they among 
the four courts providing the lowest percentages of oral arguments and constituting the 
largest percentages of panels with visitors? See Working Papers, supra note 6, at 93 tbls.2 & 
3, 101 tbl.1, 108 tbl.6a. 
162 See, e.g., Oversight Hearings, supra note 142; Interim Report, supra note 142; Hug, 
supra note 3, at 908-09; Tobias, supra note 4, at 314-15. 
163 See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text. 
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2. Specific Suggestions 
All of the circuits should canvass their individual circumstances, while 
the specific appellate courts might attempt to identify areas that require 
improvement and test efficacious measures which would rectify or 
ameliorate any difficulties detected. The Ninth Circuit Evaluation 
Committee affords an instructive model for the type of effort that I 
propose. Every appellate court could also examine the information 
collected by the Commission to delineate ways in which each circuit 
seems to function less effectively than other courts. 
Once the circuits have completed this exercise in introspection and 
designated aspects of their operations that might be enhanced, the 
appellate courts should specify approaches which warrant 
experimentation. One valuable source will be the mechanisms that the 
remaining eleven circuits have permanently applied or tested to treat 
growing caseloads with relatively restricted resources. The measures 
taken by other circuits can be examined three ways: (1) through the 
identification of appeals courts which performed comparatively well in 
terms of the parameters for which the commissioners assembled 
objective empirical data; (2) through intercircuit communication 
regarding constructive techniques and; (3) through the Federal Judicial 
Center and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts that 
serve as national clearinghouses for similar information about the 
appellate courts. The circuits could concomitantly consult the 
Commission suggestions, apart from the divisional recommendation. 
For instance, appeals courts, such as the Fifth Circuit, which experience 
burgeoning caseloads, might consider experimentation with two-judge, 
and district court appellate panels, while those circuits that have not 
employed bankruptcy appellate panels may want to evaluate their 
institution.164 The appeals courts then should carefully implement 
concepts which promise to address any deficiencies found. 
The Ninth Circuit must continue deploying the innovative approaches 
that have permitted the tribunal to resolve rather expeditiously, 
inexpensively, fairly and consistently the largest appellate court docket. 
These mechanisms include an executive committee which has important 
responsibilities for circuit governance, procedures for identifying 
'" See MCKENNA, supra note 8, at 127-33; LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 8, at 131-32; 
Final Report, supra note 1, at 31, 62-66, 68; Gordon Berrnant & Judy Sloan, Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panels: The Ninth Circuit's Experience, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 181 (1989). Congress should 
authorize testing of two-judge, and district court appellate, panels under a statute like that 
the Commission proposed. 
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appeals that present similar issues, bankruptcy appellate panels and 
special screening groups comprised of three judges which each month 
resolve 140 cases previously designated by the court's staff as less 
complex.165 The Ninth Circuit also ought to test new approaches, such as 
a requirement that every three-judge panel have one member whose 
chambers are located in the region from which the appeal arises.166 The 
court might derive those ideas from studying the other circuits or from 
the work that its Evaluation Committee is performing. 
The experimentation which the appellate courts undertake must 
receive rigorous analysis.167 This means that testing should proceed for 
enough time in sufficiently diverse contexts to ascertain, with 
confidence, the efficacy of the concepts which circuits apply. An expert, 
independent entity must scrutinize that experimentation by 
systematically assembling, evaluating and synthesizing the greatest 
practicable quantity of reliable empirical material. Once appeals courts 
have conducted the testing and it has received close assessment, 
Congress and appellate judges should be able to determine more 
conclusively whether individual circuits do not deliver justice or operate 
effectively and, if so, why. Congress and appellate judges must also 
designate the most efficacious remedies for any problems delineated. 
C. A Miscellany of Additional Ideas 
The analysis above suggests that additional study, perhaps combined 
with further experimentation, would be the best course of action. 
Nevertheless, some members of Congress or the appeals court bench 
could find that the condition of a specific circuit or the entire system is 
dire enough to reject more evaluation and testing. Other senators and 
representatives or appellate judges may believe that the appeals courts 
have received adequate analysis, particularly after the recent 
Commission effort, or that it is now time to act. 
If these circumstances exist, lawmakers and the appellate judiciary 
must remember that the efficacious performance of a century-old 
institution is at stake and that they should proceed cautiously. 
105 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 31; supra note 164 and accompanying text; see also 
Hellman, RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 130 (analyzing these and other measures); 
Tobias, supra note 7, at 240. 
1
" The court recently instituted experimentation with this requirement. See Oversight 
Hearings, supra note 142; Interim Report, supra note 142, at 12-13. 
1
" See BAKER, supra note 43, at 287-301; Tobias, supra note 4, at 314-15; Tobias, supra 
note 42, at 1283-88. 
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Legislators and judges, therefore, might want to consider a miscellany of 
possibilities. One valuable contribution which the commissioners made 
was to confirm certain conventional wisdom regarding the circuits. 
Most important is the idea that virtually all of the appeals courts have 
confronted docket increases with comparatively few resources and will 
probably face analogous situations in the future. 168 This determination 
means that there are two major ways of proceeding. The first is to 
decrease the quantity of cases, essentially by restricting federal civil or 
criminal jurisdiction, an idea which Commissioners Justice White and 
Judge Merritt proffered in their "Additional Views."169 However, that 
option has little promise, because senators and representatives are 
apparently unwilling to limit jurisdiction.170 The second alternative, 
therefore, is addressing directly the inexorable rise in appeals which 
lawyers and litigants bring. 
A somewhat controversial means of frontally treating docket growth is 
to enlarge the judicial and other resources of individual circuits that 
experience difficulties resolving substantial caseloads. For example, an 
infusion of judgeships could enable the courts to provide more oral 
arguments and published opinions while relying less on visiting judges. 
A readily available source for the precise number of judges who might 
be needed is the Judicial Conference recommendations for Congress, 
which are premised on relatively conservative estimates of appellate 
dockets and judicial workloads.171 The Conference suggestions are 
embodied in a proposed measure that senators have introduced.172 Much 
controversy attends the questions whether additional judgeships are 
advisable and, if so, precisely how many. 
This approach, thus, may be impractical, especially given 
congressional refusal to expand the federal bench's size in the last decade 
and considerable legislative and judicial opposition to creating new 
positions for the system and specific courts.173 If the idea is too 
controversial or lawmakers remain uncertain, temporary judgeships 
168 See Final Report, supra note 1, at ix; supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
169 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 77-88. See generally MCKENNA, supra note 8, at 141-
53; LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 8, at 134. 
170 See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 29, 34-37 (1990); Dragich, supra note 45, at 16-17; William P. Marshall, Federalization: A 
Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 722-25 (1995). I emphasize the role of Congress in 
the remainder of this subsection because it must authorize most of the actions proposed. 
171 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
in See S.1145, 106th Cong. (1999). 
173 See supra notes 87, 124-28 and accompanying text. See generally Carl Tobias, Federal 
Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L. J. 527 (1998). 
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could be a pragmatic compromise that essentially permits 
experimentation. Congress might concomitantly appropriate greater 
resources for circuit staff. However, these increases may further 
bureaucratize appeals courts which some observers believe are already 
too bureaucratic.174 
Legislators and circuit judges should also carefully consider numerous 
structural and non-structural measures for addressing caseload growth 
that federal court observers have advanced over the last half-century. 
The Commission canvassed a number of these approaches and 
recommended some. Senators and representatives may want to 
scrutinize those possibilities, such as two-judge, and district court 
appellate panels, which the Commission suggested, and decide whether 
they warrant experimentation or deserve permanent implementation. 
Lawmakers and judges should correspondingly evaluate other 
concepts that the commissioners examined but did not prescribe or 
minimally explored in their report. These encompass a plethora of 
alternatives which federal courts observers, including individuals and 
entities that conducted prior studies, have thoroughly surveyed.175 The 
options range along a broad spectrum from abolition of the regional 
circuits, to radical reconfiguration of the existing system, to modest 
reforms in particular courts, to tinkering with present appellate 
procedures. 
A constructive action which the Senate should implement for all of the 
circuits that now have judicial vacancies is expeditiously filling the 
empty seats. This is important because delayed confirmation of judges 
for these openings can disrupt smooth court administration.176 This is 
especially true for the Ninth Circuit, which has operated for much of the 
time since 1995 absent one-fourth of its active members.177 Senators 
might promptly approve nominees for the three present vacancies on the 
Ninth Circuit and ascertain whether this solution rectifies or ameliorates 
perceived problems in the Ninth Circuit. For example, if the court were 
functioning with all 28 active judges authorized by Congress, the circuit 
174 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 26-28 (1985); 
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT 
ADMINISTRATION 94-125 (1995); see also Final Report, supra note 1, at 23-25; MCKENNA, supra 
note 8, at 49-55. 
175 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 43, at 106-286; sources cited supra note 8. 
1
" See LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 8, at 102-05; see also Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial 
Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 M!Ss. C. L. REv. 319, 327 
(1994); Tobias, supra note 173, at 539-40, 550-51. 
177 See Tobias, supra note 42. 
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could afford higher percentages of oral arguments and published 
opinions, employ fewer visiting judges and resolve appeals faster. 
Legislators and the appellate judiciary as well might scrutinize the 
efforts of those appeals courts which work particularly well in order to 
ascertain whether approaches that they follow could be applied in other 
tribunals.178 For instance, the circuits which decide cases rather slowly 
might derive helpful suggestions by examining appellate courts which 
expeditiously conclude appeals. The tribunals must concomitantly 
engage in greater intercircuit communication through the exchange of 
productive ideas that may improve appeals court operations. illustrative 
are bankruptcy appellate panels, which the Ninth Circuit employed so 
successfully that Congress required all of the appellate courts to consider 
implementing the mechanisms.179 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals fulfilled its substantial responsibilities to assess the regional 
circuits in the brief period which senators and representatives provided. 
The commissioners compiled an informative descriptive account of the 
appellate courts at century's end. However, the description will not 
support conclusive determinations regarding the circuits. Therefore, 
Congress should authorize additional study or further experimentation 
with promising measures. 
178 See supra note 161. 
,,., See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104(c), 108 Stat. 4106, 
4109-10; see also LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 8, at 47; supra note 164 and accompanying 
text. 
